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On January 24, 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear the case of a British Columbia mother seeking to change the Employment Insurance Act and employment standards legislation to allow maternity leave for adoptive parents. In refusing to hear the case, the Court upheld the 2007 federal Court of Appeal ruling Tomasson v. Canada (Attorney General) that adoptive mothers do not qualify for maternity benefits because they do not undergo the “physiological and psychological experience” of pregnancy and childbirth.

Under employment standards legislation, birth mothers can take a total of 52 weeks of leave when they combine maternity (17 weeks) and parental leave (35 weeks), and are entitled to receive a total of 50 weeks of EI benefits (combination of 15 weeks of maternity and 35 weeks of parental EI benefits) for that period. However, the same benefits are not available to adoptive mothers. Adoptive mothers only receive 37 weeks of parental leave and 35 weeks of EI benefits.

Recently, the media reported that a movement to challenge the law to provide equal EI benefits to adoptive parents is gaining momentum. The discrepancy in the law is something advocates like the Adoption Council of Canada are hoping will be addressed when the House of Commons standing committee on human resources tables a long-awaited report on adoption in the next few weeks.

To understand why the federal government continues to differentiate between birth mothers and adoptive mothers when allocating EI benefits, you need to take a closer look at the Tomasson case.

Federal Court of Appeal ruling: Tomasson v. Canada (Attorney General)

The main issue in this case was whether the provisions of the Employment Insurance Act, which grants maternity benefits only to biological mothers, discriminates against adoptive mothers and violates their rights under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Charter states that:

Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.

Tomasson argued that the purpose of maternity benefits is to recover from the birth and to bond with the child. She asserted that although she did not need to recover from the birth, she required the time to bond with and attach to the child. She provided evidence regarding the typical attachment process between mother and child, including a child who is adopted early in infancy. Tomasson showed that the process of attachment for children who are adopted early in infancy is similar to that of typical attachment.

The Court stated that the purpose of maternity benefits is:

• To protect women who work from the economic costs of pregnancy and childbirth while they recover from the birth
• To ensure biological mothers experience no disadvantage when they return to the workforce

It is not to encourage bonding or attachment.

The Court also pointed to previous cases stating that it is not necessarily discriminatory to treat biological mothers differently from other parents, including adoptive parents. Although adoptive parents undergo challenges in adopting and caring for their children, these challenges are not as severe and distressing as the physical and psychological challenges facing biological mothers.

The Court applied the test of discrimination and found the following:

• The comparator groups were biological mothers and adoptive mothers
• There was indeed differential treatment between the two groups of mothers within the Employment Insurance scheme
• The differential treatment did not have a purpose or effect that was discriminatory within the meaning of the equality guarantee as set out in the Charter
• It was impossible to find that in enacting maternity benefits provisions in the Act, Parliament demeaned adoptive mothers or cast any doubt on their worthiness as human beings
• In addition, the needs of adoptive parents were accommodated when Parliament enacted parental benefits

Consequently, the distinction in the Employment Insurance provisions was not discriminatory against adoptive parents. In fact, the maternity leave provisions ensure the equality of women who suffer the disadvantage in the workplace due to pregnancy-related matters. The distinction created was legitimate because it sought to accommodate the needs of pregnant women in the workforce as a disadvantaged group. Thus, the distinction did not violate the Charter, and Tomasson’s appeals were dismissed.

Conclusion
Certain groups of individuals can be and are required to be treated differently in order to ensure equality. In this situation, there was a legitimate purpose to the Employment Insurance provisions in order to ensure equality. The test of discrimination was applied; Tomasson was not successful. Consequently, adoptive parents have access to parental benefits, and biological parents have access to both maternity and parental benefits within the Employment Insurance scheme.

Yosie Saint-Cyr
First Reference Human Resources and Compliance Managing Editor

© 2012 First Reference Inc. All Rights Reserved. | Permalink | One comment |

The majority confirmed that section 2(d) protects workers’ right to associate to achieve collective goals. This requires a process of engagement that permits employee associations to make representations to employers. It clarified as well that the AEPA requires, by implication, that employers consider and discuss the employee representations in good faith. This means that the section requires employers and employees to meet and bargain in the pursuit of a common goal of peaceful and productive accommodation, by way of “meaningful” dialogue.

However, the majority found that section 2(d) does not impose a particular process for the parties to reach an agreement or accept any particular terms, and it does not guarantee a legislated dispute resolution mechanism in the case of an impasse. The Charter’s protection has to do with a meaningful process of collective bargaining, not with a particular model of labour relations or a specific bargaining method. This was where the Court of Appeal overstated the scope of the Charter right to freedom of association. In fact, the affirmation of the right to collective bargaining is not the same thing as an affirmation of a particular type of collective bargaining, such as the model under the Labour Relations Act.

As a result, laws or state actions that “substantially interfere” with the ability to achieve workplace goals through collective actions have the effect of negating the right of freedom of association and constitute a limit on section 2(d) of the Charter, causing the law or action to be unconstitutional unless justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court concluded that, in this case, the AEPA does not violate section 2(d) of the Charter because the AEPA contains the essential components protected by section 2(d) of the Charter.

Further, the AEPA does not violate section 15(1) of the Charter involving equality rights. Even though the AEPA does not provide agricultural workers all of the protections that are afforded to other workers under the Labour Relations Act, the distinction does not lead to a finding of discrimination. There simply was no substantive discrimination that impacted on individuals stereotypically or in ways that reinforced existing prejudice and disadvantage.

Thus, the Court found the AEPA to be constitutional.

The majority clarified that the AEPA, without expressly stating so, requires employers to meet and to bargain in good faith with employees in the pursuit of a common goal of peaceful and productive accommodation. Hopefully this clarification requiring meaningful dialogue will assist workers and prevent employers from ignoring them.

At the same time, the majority left the door open to future complaints about the tribunal established in the AEPA and any potential complaints under section 15(1) of the Charter. It suggested that complaints about these things right now are premature, but they could be launched at a later time once the regime has been used and tested.

However, Justice Abella offered important dissenting comments. Abella clearly felt that the AEPA violates section 2(d) of the Charter. She argued that the AEPA contains no language whatsoever that protects the process of collective bargaining; it only requires the employer to “listen to” or “acknowledge” employee representations. Thus, two provisions should be added to the AEPA in order to protect workers’ labour rights: a statutory enforcement mechanism with a mandate to resolve bargaining disputes, and a requirement that the employer bargain only with the representative selected by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit (majoritarian exclusivity). According to Justice Abella, these important elements of the labour relations regime cannot be overlooked.

Abella noted that the majority decided the way it did because it was not assessing the AEPA using the new constitutional standard set out in its own 2007 decision in BC Health Services. That decision expanded the scope of section 2(d) of the Charter to include protection for a process of collective bargaining as we know it under the Labour Relations Act, including the duty to consult and negotiate in good faith.

Abella concluded that a complete exclusion of all agricultural workers from labour relations protections is severely restrictive, especially since other jurisdictions provide for collective bargaining protections, and these protections do not show evidence of harm to family farms. The restrictions simply could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter. The main reasons why the workers were deprived of any labour protections included “protecting the family farm” and “farm production/viability”; these factors are important, but the complete absence of any statutory protection for a process of collective bargaining in the AEPA cannot be said to be minimally impairing of the section 2(d) rights of the workers. The limitation was not even remotely tailored to either government objective; in fact, it was not tailored at all. This was a story of complete harm, not minimal harm.

The majority’s decision was surprising for many, given that it was widely expected that the Supreme Court would uphold the Court of Appeal’s decision. We were expecting that things would be different for agricultural workers now that the SCC had taken on a more remedial role using the Charter only a few years ago. I think this door will reopen in the future through a section 15(1) claim under the Charter, and I think agricultural workers will be able to win their case after the AEPA has been used and tested more thoroughly.

Something tells me this is not the end of the debate…

Christina Catenacci
First Reference Human Resources and Compliance Editor

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The case involves a high school computer science teacher who was arrested after police found nude photographs of a student (a minor) on the hard disk of a laptop owned by the school in his possession and use. He was charged under section 163.1 (4) and 342.1 (1) of the Criminal Code with possession of child pornography and fraudulently obtaining those photographs from the student’s computer.

This all came to light when a school computer technician who was working on the school server discovered a number of irregularities on the teacher’s computer and alerted the principal. The school board investigated and conducted a search of the employee’s hard drive and found a large number of pornographic images in the browser history. The board safeguarded the evidence on a disc and gave it to police officers who conducted further searches without a warrant or the teacher’s consent, claiming the computer was school property.

By acknowledging the employee’s expectation of privacy with regard to the contents of his laptop computer, the Court of Appeal found that the employee did have a reasonable expectation of privacy. They concluded that other teachers also used the school’s laptops for personal reasons, used individual passwords, that the school had no plans to use workplace policies to guide or restrict how staff used those computers.

Moreover, the Court stated:

Although this was a work computer owned by the school board and issued for employment purposes with access to the school network, the school board gave the teachers possession of the laptops, explicit permission to use the laptops for personal use and take the computers home … they employed passwords to exclude others … There was no clear and unambiguous policy to monitor, search or police the teachers’ use of their laptops.

However, the Court agreed that this expectation of privacy is not limitless. The employer has the duty to promote a safe learning environment and to this end, the computer technician acted within the scope of his functions by intercepting the illegal content and alerting the principal. Thus, the principal and the school board acted reasonably under the circumstances without violating the privacy rights of the individual under Section 8 of the Charter. On the other hand, the Court concluded that this was not the case for the police. In the Court’s opinion, the police violated Section 8 of the Charter, and under section 24 (2), the evidence obtained without a warrant must be discarded.

Many employment lawyers and privacy experts believe that this decision will have a significant impact for employers across the country, largely because the decision departs from the traditional tendency that ownership means control of workplace privacy. This is a further incentive for employers to ensure employees know what the rules are by implementing several very important policies related to privacy and computer, Internet and email use, as well as general conduct and behaviour in the workplace.

When implementing a policy governing the use of workplace computers, make sure to address monitoring, searching and policing, as well as permitted use. This will reinforce that employees should not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using workplace computers.

To read more about this topic and obtain sample policies and procedures, consult the following First Reference Inc. publications:

• HRinfodesk
• The Human Resources Advisor
• Human Resources PolicyPro

Yosie Saint-Cyr
First Reference Human Resources and Employment Law Compliance Managing Editor

© 2011 First Reference Inc. All Rights Reserved. | Permalink | Make a comment |

The Charter only applies to the actions of the federal government, provincial governments, and federally regulated industries. Recent case law has demonstrated the length to which tribunals and courts are prepared to go to protect Charter rights within those spheres. A recent decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal considered a complaint filed by two Air Canada pilots arising from their forced retirement at age 60. The pilots contended that the airlines’ retirement policy breached their Charter rights under s. 15.1 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of age. Air Canada responded that the discrimination was justified based on s. 15 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. That section provides that it is not a discriminatory practice if employment is refused based on a “bona fide occupational requirement”.

The tribunal had originally held that there had been no Charter violation on the basis that 60 was the normal retirement age for pilots. As a result, the dismissals were protected by s. 15(1)(c) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The pilots appealed that ruling and, in April 2009, the federal court granted the Application for Judicial Review and sent the Complaint back to the tribunal for further consideration. The court directed that the tribunal determine whether s. 15(1)(c) could be saved by s. 1 of the Charter as being justified as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society. If the tribunal found that it was not, it was then directed to determine whether the retirement provision was a “bona fide occupational requirement” under the Human Rights Act.

Following up on the court’s direction, the tribunal held that, in fact, the Complaint by the pilots was justified and that the mandatory retirement requirement was a breach of the pilots’ Charter rights. The tribunal then went on to consider the remedy which flowed from such a finding. The tribunal first ordered that the pilots be reinstated as soon as they could demonstrate that they had met the requirements for service − i.e. a valid Pilot Licence, Medical Certificate, and Instrument Flight Rating Certificate. However, the Tribunal refused the pilots’ request for damages for pain and suffering of $20,000 each as not being justified by the facts. Finally, the tribunal refused to make a general finding with respect to all pilots covered by the policy, on the basis that a general declaration of invalidity of a policy is not available to the tribunal under the statute.

It should be pointed out that the union has launched an Application for judicial review of this decision in federal court. The union supports mandatory retirement as it is in the interests of the bulk of the members to as it creates opportunities for advancement within the airline. The Application for judicial review was argued in November 2010 but no ruling has been issued as yet. No doubt, whichever way the court decides, the case will be appealed further and will likely end up before the Supreme Court of Canada.

Earl Altman
Garfinkle, Biderman LLP

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Although the government insists it is “committed to providing accessible online information and services to Canadians, and is continuing to look at ways to make information more accessible to all Canadians”, Treasury Board spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold said:

The Government of Canada is filing an appeal with the Federal Court decision in the case between Donna Jodhan and the Attorney General of Canada in order to address some fundamental issues raised by the decision.

These include factual findings made by the Court, numerous aspects of the legal reasoning applied to those facts, and the unusual supervisory order of the Court to monitor implementation of its decision.

Justice Michael Kelen in his ruling said he would oversee implementation of Ottawa’s online retrofit, and he warned that the Court will intervene if the government fails to act.

Justice Kelen’s hard line does not seem to suit the government at all!

Is this a step back on the road to accessible information, goods and services for all disabled persons?

Yosie Saint-Cyr
First Reference Human Resources and Compliance Managing Editor

© 2011 First Reference Inc. All Rights Reserved. | Permalink | Make a comment |

The 64-year-old worker at the centre of the case suffered an industrial accident on November 29, 2007, which forced him to stop working. On November 29, 2008, the date which marked the beginning of his second year of compensation and having reached the age of 65, his indemnity was reduced pursuant to section 56 of the Act, which provides for the following:

The income replacement indemnity is reduced by 25% from the sixty-fifth birthday of the worker, by 50% from the second year and by 75% from the third year following the said date.

Notwithstanding the first paragraph, the income replacement indemnity of a worker who suffered an employment injury when 64 years of age is reduced, by 25% from the second year following the date of the beginning of his disability, by 50% from the third year and by 75% from the fourth year following the said date.

The worker believes that he suffered prejudice from the workers’ compensation benefits reduction just because he turned 65.

Quebec’s Attorney General argued that the average retirement age of workers in Quebec is just in excess of 59 years of age; therefore, it was quite reasonable to expect a reduction in income, whether at work or on workers’ compensation benefits. It was also argued that the reduction in workers’ compensation benefits by statute is an acceptable and reasonable compromise based on the reality of the average retirement age, and the need for certainty in funding of the workers’ compensation system.

To establish a discrimination claim, one must prove that a law, in purpose or effect, conflicts with the purpose of section 15 of the Canadian Charter. To do this, the Court of Appeal applied the precedent-setting Supreme Court of Canada case, Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S. C. R. 497.

The Law test applies the following factors to determine whether discrimination has occurred:

1. Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability experienced by the individual or group at issue
2. The correspondence or lack thereof, between the ground or grounds on which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity or circumstances of the claimant or others
3. The ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more disadvantaged person or group in society
4. The nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned law

The tribunal found that the distinction created by section 56 of the Act perpetuates prejudices and stereotypes against older workers specifically as they relate to their ability to work. A person should not be punished for wanting to work past what would generally be considered a “normal” age. Consequently, the Workers’ Compensation Board may not reduce a worker’s benefits simply because he or she is older than another similarly situated worker. Any apportionment to age, per se, runs afoul of section 15 of the Charter.

Quebec is not the only jurisdiction in Canada with such a provision in its workers’ compensation and other legislation. This case may ultimately have serious implications across the country. Marianne Plamondon, a lawyer with Ogilvy Renault LLP in Montreal, stated to The Lawyers Weekly that “Our whole system in Canada is based on a recognized retirement age of 65. Income replacement laws require payments to stop or be reduced at this age.”

I am quite sure the final word will come from the Supreme Court of Canada.

Yosie Saint-Cyr
First Reference Human Resources and Compliance Managing Editor

© 2011 First Reference Inc. All Rights Reserved. | Permalink | Make a comment |

Jodhan, who is a special-needs business consultant with an MBA, and is also legally blind, sought a declaration under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act that the standards implemented by the federal government for providing visually impaired Canadians with access to government information and services on the Internet, and the way in which those standards are implemented, denied her equal access to government information and services, and thereby violated her rights under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The federal government submits that the Federal Court can only deal with the specific complaints of the applicant and cannot treat this application for a declaration as one with respect to a systemic failure by all government departments and agencies to apply accessibility standards for the visually impaired.

The constitutional court challenge was filed three years ago after she was unable to apply for government jobs or complete the 2006 Census online, notwithstanding the government’s accessibility standards for the visually impaired, which have been in effect since 2001.

It is important to note that Jodhan is the owner of Sterling Creations, a consulting business that provides analyses and recommendations to clients regarding the accessibility of their products or services to special-needs users. Her qualifications and profession support her characterization of herself as a sophisticated computer user, familiar with accessing the Internet.

She argued that her equality rights were being violated when she was denied access to government services and information on the basis of her physical disability.

Visually impaired and blind individuals can independently access Internet content online using specific assistive technologies. These include screen readers, which are software devices that read website content aloud to the user, and Braille output devices, which are devices that convert website content into Braille for the user to read tactilely. Screen readers are long-established software programs to make computers accessible to blind and visually impaired users. Suzanne Cohen Share offered a good explanation of the screen reader technology last week.

The Internet accessibility standards established by the federal government are set out in the CLF 1.0 Standard, which was to be implemented by 2001. The CLF Standard is built upon international guidelines, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 1.0 (WCAG 1.0) produced in 1999 by the World Wide Web Consortium, an international organization devoted to developing technical standards for the Internet. This standard provides detailed instructions to developers of Internet content, such as website designers, regarding how to help make content accessible to people with disabilities, including the visually impaired.

The World Wide Web Consortium updated those accessibility standards in 2007 to CLF 2.0 Standard. However, the government wasn’t implementing or enforcing the new standards, and those being applied were obsolete. This was demonstrated in several external audits and reports (refer to Court decision).

The evidence with regard to the inaccessibility of federal government websites comes from three sources. First, a number of reports have demonstrated failures of numerous government websites to meet even the basic priorities of the obsolete CLF Standard, which means that the blind cannot access the websites. Second, the applicant has submitted affidavit evidence from herself, another visually impaired person, and her expert witness that describe barriers to access encountered on government websites. Third, the respondent’s witnesses have acknowledged instances of non-compliance on federal government websites.

After hearing the evidence, the Court was satisfied that the government websites were not fully accessible to the visually impaired and not in compliance with the CLF Standard. “The negative effect on the applicant and the visually impaired is clear. If they have to rely upon sighted assistance they lose their independence, their dignity and their ability to accurate and timely information on an equal basis with a sighted person”. The Court was also satisfied that the evidence supported a system-wide failure by government departments and agencies to comply with and implement the CLF Standard as required by a report several years ago.

Thus, the Court found the government failed to monitor and ensure compliance with its own 2001 accessibility standards is an infringement of section 15(1) of the Charter, since it discriminates against the applicant and other visually impaired persons. The Court also declared that the government has a constitutional obligation to bring itself into compliance with the Charter within a reasonable time period, such as 15 months.

Jay Denning, a spokesman for the Treasury Board of Canada, said the government is still reviewing the decision.

This is a clear indication that accessibility standards are being taken seriously by the courts. Ontario organizations in the private sector who have to comply with the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act (AODA) Customer Service Standard by January 1, 2012, should start getting ready. If your organization is not aware of the extent of their obligations under this first standard, know that private sector organizations that provide goods or services with at least one employee in Ontario must implement the customer service standard under the AODA by January 1, 2012.

There are several blog post on First Reference Talks on the topic, but a good overview is provided here.

Yosie Saint-Cyr
First Reference Human Resources and Compliance Managing Editor

© 2010 First Reference Inc. All Rights Reserved. | Permalink | Make a comment |

Image taken from: www.fraport.com

Between November 22 and November 25, 2010, the Federal Court of Canada will hold hearings and then decide whether the mandatory retirement age of 60 years should stand for about 3,000 Air Canada pilots.

I reviewed the case history and found that this saga has been going on for years.

It seems to revolve around one subsection of the Canadian Human Rights Act: 15(1)(c) states that it is not a discriminatory practice if an individual’s employment is terminated because that individual has reached the normal age of retirement for employees working in positions similar to the position of that individual.

This section has created some controversy. In fact, it has been questioned in the courts, and there may be a final answer about its effect on pilots’ retirements after these hearings take place.

The story is that two Air Canada pilots were required to retire at the age of 60 years pursuant to Air Canada’s policy. Although they retired pursuant to the policy, they both filed human rights complaints in 2005 alleging that the mandatory retirement policy was discriminatory.

In August 2007, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal found that Air Canada was permitted to require both pilots to retire at 60 years because subsection 15(1)(c) of the Act permitted the airline to have a policy of mandatory retirement as long as it was consistent with the retirement age of similarly placed employees. Indeed, the retirement age for most pilots working for major international carriers was 60 years. What’s more, this section of the Act was not contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (equality provisions).

The pilots appealed to the Federal Court.

In April 2009, the Federal Court concluded that the tribunal had incorrectly analyzed the application of the Charter to section 15(1)(c) of the Act, and referred the matter back to the tribunal for further consideration.

In August 2009, the tribunal released a second decision; this time, it found that section 15(1)(c) of the Act was actually inconsistent with section 15 of the Charter. Further, the tribunal found that previous Supreme Court of Canada decisions on the matter were distinguishable based on current circumstances, including the fact that many provincial jurisdictions had since abolished mandatory retirement. They no longer set the precedent.

It is not over yet. The judicial review of the tribunal’s second decision is about to be decided. Time will tell what will come of mandatory retirement ages for Air Canada pilots, and how other federally regulated employees will be affected by the decision.

Christina Catenacci
First Reference Human Resources and Compliance Editor

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In R. v. Patrick, the Court decided that once someone deposits waste outside for collection, police or other government officials, and perhaps other private parties, might have the right to snag the trash for evidence before the garbage man stops by.

Maybe this sounds meaningless to you, and maybe it is meaningless to most, but the point is that in the wake of this decision, organizations should reconsider their waste disposal practices to ensure that they are not tossing out valuable—or incriminating—information that might be used against them.

In Patrick, Calgary police examined the garbage of a man they suspected of producing ecstasy in his home. Eventually, they collected enough evidence from the garbage to get a search warrant, which led them to the man’s home ecstasy operations and criminal charges.

The man appealed the police searches of his garbage, citing section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees freedom from unreasonable search or seizure. But every court, right to the top, rejected the argument, and found the searches reasonable, indicating that the man had a “diminished expectation of privacy” with respect to the garbage he left out for collection. Calgary even has a by-law—as presumably most municipalities do—that prohibits “scaveng[ing] waste from a commercial bin, waste container or plastic garbage bag“, and the police officers had to trespass onto the man’s property to get at the garbage.

If that sounds frightening, even to you, our law-abiding reader, it should be. But the Supreme Court offered two caveats to the decision, which should allow you to breathe easier:

1. In this case, “there was no manifestation of a continuing assertion of privacy or control” over the garbage. In other words, the man made no attempt to restrict access to the garbage once he put it out, and thus he implicitly reduced his expectation of privacy.
2. The Court stated, “Before the state can rummage through the personal information from [waste], there should be, at the very least, a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is likely to be committed.

While still vague, these clarifications allow individuals and organizations to protect themselves from garbage searches. For example, organizations can secure their waste, or keep it indoors until collection day; one might also argue that video surveillance of waste bins amounts to a “continuing assertion of privacy or control” over the trash. I can’t say how to avoid raising reasonable suspicion, but you can’t lose by maintaining good governance and operating policies and procedures (and avoiding committing crimes).

The key is: a responsible organization might not be able to simply toss its waste and forget about it any more. You might not think your organization’s garbage contains any useful or valuable information in it—it is garbage after all—and you might think that your organization is above suspicion, but do you want to take that chance?

Does your organization have a waste disposal policy? Will you be updating it to take into account R. V. Patrick?

Adam Gorley
First Reference, ICL Editor

© 2010 First Reference Inc. All Rights Reserved. | Permalink | 2 comments |